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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This paper is a contribution to the growing literature on constrained inefficiencies in 
economies with financial frictions.  The purpose is to present two simple examples, inspired 
by the stochastic models in Gersbach-Rochet (2012) and Lorenzoni (2008), of deterministic 
environments in which such inefficiencies arise through credit constraints.  Common to both 
examples is a pecuniary externality, which operates through an asset price.  In the second 
example, a simple transfer between two groups of agents can bring about a Pareto 
improvement.   
In a first best economy, there are no pecuniary externalities because marginal 
productivities are equalised.  But when agents face credit constraints, there is a wedge 
between their marginal productivities and those of the non-credit-constrained agents.  The 
wedge is the source of the pecuniary externality:  economies with these kinds of 
imperfections in credit markets are not second-best efficient.   This is akin to the constrained 
inefficiency of an economy with incomplete markets, as in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis 
(1986). 
 
 
  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 This paper is a contribution to the growing literature on second-best inefficiencies in 
economies with financial frictions.1  My purpose is to present two examples of deterministic 
environments in which pecuniary externalities arise through credit constraints. 
 The first example is inspired by Gersbach-Rochet (2012).  I simplify and modify their 
stochastic model to show that the second-best inefficiency they identify is present in a two-
period environment without uncertainty.  The welfare measure I use to demonstrate 
constrained inefficiency is aggregate surplus – for which, of course, it is easier to exhibit a 
welfare improvement than if, say, the Pareto criterion were used. 
 The second example is inspired by Lorenzoni (2008).  I simplify and modify his 
stochastic model to show that uncertainty is not necessary to his analysis.  But here the 
welfare criterion I use is more demanding: I demonstrate that a simple transfer between two 
groups of agents can bring about a Pareto improvement.   
Common to both examples is a pecuniary externality, which operates through an asset 
price.  In a first best economy, we know that there are no pecuniary externalities because 
marginal productivities are equalised.  But in both my examples, certain agents face credit 
constraints.  On account of these credit constraints, there is a wedge between their marginal 
productivities and those of the non-credit-constrained agents.  The wedge is the source of the 
pecuniary externality:  economies with these kinds of imperfections in credit markets are not 
even second-best efficient.  This is akin to the constrained inefficiency of an economy with 
incomplete markets.  See, for example, Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See, for example, Lorenzoni (2008), Jeanne and Korinek (2010), Korinek (2011), Davila 
(2012), Gersbach and Rochet (2012), He and Kondor (2012), Hart and Zingales (2013), 
Jeanne and Korinek (2013).  For papers that are of a more dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) nature, see, for example, Bianchi and Mendoza (2010), Jeanne and 
Korinek (2010).  There are also papers on exchange rate externalities as opposed to asset 
price externalities; see, for example, Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003), Korinek (2011).  
At the intersection of DSGE and exchange rate externalities, see, for example, Bianchi 
(2011). 
	  
EXAMPLE 1 
 There are two days, 0 and 1, and two groups of agents, sheep farmers and wine 
makers.  Production occurs overnight, between days 0 and 1.  Consumption is on day 1.  The 
agents’ respective outputs, wool and wine, are perfect substitutes as consumption goods.   
Measuring them so as to be one-for-one in consumption, we can take wool and wine to be a 
common unit of account, “output”, the numeraire. 
 Besides their own non-tradable labour, sheep farmers and wine makers both use land 
as an input to production.  Land can be traded on day 0, in exchange for a promise to deliver 
day 1 output, wool or wine.  But – and this is the key to the model – the promise has to be 
credible.  The only trade in this economy is the exchange of land on day 0 for a credible 
promise to deliver day 1 output. 
 Land is variably productive.  Think of land in thin contours, or strips, in a valley 
whose cross-section has the shape of an inverted Gothic arch; see Figure 1.  Along each 
contour, parallel to the valley floor, the land is at a constant altitude and is homogeneous.  
Take the overall width of the valley, perpendicular to the valley floor, to be 2, and suppose 
the altitude (above sea-level, not the valley floor) of a contour horizontal distance K from the 
valley floor is given by the constant elasticity function 
 
    η(a + 1 – K)η-1  where a > 0 and 0 < η < 1. 
 
Productivity – both for sheep rearing and vine growing measured per (tiny) unit-width strip – 
varies across strips.  It can depend on the altitude of the strip as well as on which side of the 
valley the strip is on.  
 
 On the dark side of the valley, the left side of Figure 1, the sun seldom shines and so 
the productivity of growing vines is less than on the right, the sunny side.  But the 
productivity of growing vines is not affected by altitude: it is a constant, Rℓ > 0, on the left; 
and a constant, Rh  > Rℓ, on the right. 
 
 Rearing sheep is affected by altitude – sheep thrive in higher altitudes – but is 
unaffected by light.  Supposing that productivity is a linear function of altitude, we can 
measure altitude so as to make them equal.  Thus, for example, if all the land on one side of   
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the valley, above a contour horizontal distance K from the valley floor, were devoted to sheep 
rearing, then output from this land would be 
 
    (a + 1 – K)η  –  aη       ≡     F(1 – K),  say. 
 
The derivative, F′(1 – K), of this function is the altitude η(a + 1 – K)η-1 – equal to the 
productivity of rearing sheep – of a strip horizontal distance K from the valley floor. 
 
 Crucially, on day 0 wine makers can credibly pledge at most a fraction θ < 1 of their 
day 1 output.  We will see that, because of this, they face a “credit constraint”.  (Note that we 
could also assume, for symmetry, that on day 0 sheep farmers too are unable to credibly 
pledge more than a fraction θ of their day 1 output, but that would not substantively affect our 
analysis.  So let us not make this assumption.)  
 
 Wine makers are endowed with all the lowest strips of land, horizontal distance up to Wℓ from the valley floor on the dark side, and up to Wh on the sunny side.  Sheep farmers are 
endowed with all the remaining land.  The values of Wℓ and Wh are small enough that at the 
boundaries, the productivity of sheep rearing is strictly less than θ times that of wine making: 
 
    F′(1 – Wℓ)  <  θRℓ	  
and 	   	   	   	   F′(1 – Wh)  <  θRh.	  	  	  
1.1. Implementation of the First-Best 
 
The initial endowment of land is not too inefficient:  the higher land (land more 
productive for sheep rearing) belongs to the sheep farmers; and the lower land (land more 
productive for vine growing) belongs to the wine makers.  But to reach first-best requires 
equating productivities at the boundaries on each side of the valley: 
 
 
F′(1 – KℓFB)   =   Rℓ	  
and 
F′(1 – KhFB)   =   Rh 
 
where KℓFB is the horizontal distance from the valley floor, in the first-best allocation, of the 
boundary between sheep rearing and vine growing on the dark side of the valley, and KhFB is 
similarly defined for the sunny side.  
 
As a preliminary observation:  implementation of this first-best allocation can be 
decentralised as a market equilibrium outcome if θ is equal to 1, so that wine makers face no 
credit constraint.   
 
Market equilibrium pricing, in the first-best when θ equals 1, is as follows.  On the 
dark side of the valley, all strips of land up to horizontal distance KℓFB from the valley floor 
are uniformly priced at Rℓ;	  	  each higher strip, horizontal distance K > KℓFB from the valley 
floor, is priced at F′(1 – K).  And on the sunny side, all strips of land up to horizontal distance 
KhFB from the valley floor are uniformly priced at Rh;  each higher strip, horizontal distance 
K > KhFB from the valley floor, is priced at F′(1 – K) – as on the dark side. 
 
 The point is that, when θ equals 1, competition drives the land price up to the zero-
profit level across the valley. 
 
  
1.2. Laissez faire equilibrium with credit constraints 
 
When the wine makers’ credit constraint binds (requiring that θ < 1), the nature of the 
land pricing is similar.  On the dark side of the valley, for some Pℓ, land horizontal distance 
up to Kℓ	  from the value floor is priced at Pℓ, where Kℓ	  solves  
 
F′(1 – Kℓ)   =   Pℓ; 
 
and each higher strip, horizontal distance K > Kℓ	  from the valley floor, is priced at F′(1 – K).  
And on the sunny side, for some Ph, land horizontal distance up to Kh from the value floor is 
priced at Pℓ,	  where Kh solves 
 F′(1 – Kh)   =   Ph; 
 
and each higher strip, horizontal distance K > Kh from the valley floor, is priced at F′(1 – K). 
 
Sheep farmers compete to buy all the higher land, the land priced above Pℓ and Ph on 
the dark and sunny sides respectively.  They make zero profit. 
 
The equilibrium values of Pℓ and Ph are determined by the behaviour of the wine 
makers.  We will see that, in equilibrium, wine makers use more land than their aggregate 
endowment; i.e. Kℓ > Wℓ and Kh > Wh. 
 
Consider a typical wine maker, endowed with land worth y.  (The argument is the 
same whichever side of the valley his endowment lies: it may be y/Pℓ	  units on the dark side, 
or y/Ph units on the sunny, or a convex combination.  He can realise y by selling his 
endowment and then investing in land either on the dark or sunny side of the valley.)  If he 
invests on the dark side, the scale of his investment k will be governed by a flow-of-funds 
constraint 
 
     Pℓk   ≤   y  +  θRℓk, 
 
given that he cannot credibly pledge more than a fraction θ of his day 1 return Rℓk.  His day 1 
net payoff is maximised when the constraint binds.  That is, his maximum payoff from 
levered investment on the dark side of the valley is   
 (1− 𝜃)𝑅ℓ𝓁𝑦𝑃ℓ𝓁   − 𝜃𝑅ℓ𝓁    
 
By a similar argument, his maximum payoff from levered investment on the sunny 
side of the valley is 
 (1− 𝜃)𝑅!𝑦𝑃! − 𝜃𝑅!  
 
In equilibrium, these rates of return on levered investment must be equalized (so as to 
have vine growing on both sides of the valley): 
 (1− 𝜃)𝑅ℓ𝓁𝑃ℓ𝓁   − 𝜃𝑅ℓ𝓁     = (1− 𝜃)𝑅!𝑃! − 𝜃𝑅!  
 
Here the denominators are the downpayments required per unit of land purchased; the 
numerators are the output that cannot be pledged. 
 
It follows from this equation that there must exist some ∝ such that 
 
Pℓ   =   ∝Rℓ	  
and 
 
Ph   =   ∝Rh 
	  
Note that ∝ is strictly greater than θ (the required downpayments are positive).  And ∝  is 
strictly less than 1 (the rates of return on levered investment exceed 1).  
 
 
1.3   Planner’s constrained optimum 
 
Think now of a planner choosing Kℓ and Kh to maximise aggregate output 
	  
Rℓ Kℓ    +   F(1 – Kℓ)   +    RhKh    +   F(1 – Kh) 
 
 
subject to the constraint 
 
 
[Kℓ – Wℓ]F′(1 – Kℓ)    +   [Kh – Wh] F′(1 – Kh)     ≤      θRℓ	  Kℓ   +   θRh Kh 
 
 
The logic here is that, in choosing Kℓ and Kh, the planner is in effect choosing prices  
Pℓ = F′(1 – Kℓ) and Ph = F′(1 – Kh).  The planner’s problem is constrained by the need to 
respect the (aggregate of the) wine makers’ credit constraints, assuming that they and the 
sheep farmers take Pℓ and Ph as parametric prices. 
 
Form the Lagrangian L, with multiplier λ.  The first-order conditions (FOCs) are: 
 
  !!!!ℓ𝓁      =    Rℓ   –   F′(1 – Kℓ)   –   λ {F′(1 – Kℓ)  –  [Kℓ – Wℓ]F′′(1 – Kℓ)  –  θRℓ} 
 
=    0 
 
  !!!!!     =    Rh   –    F′(1 – Kh)   –   λ {F′(1 – Kh)  –  [Kh – Wh]F′′(1 – Kh)  –  θRh}  
 
=    0 
 
The solution, (KℓSB, KhSB) say, to these FOCs are the second-best values of Kℓ and Kh 
 – the constrained efficient allocation of land across sheep rearing and vine growing. 
 
 
1.4   Constrained inefficiency of laissez-faire 
 
To compare these values KℓSB and KhSB with the laissez-faire equilibrium 
 
F′(1 – Kℓ)  =   ∝Rℓ 
F′(1 – Kh)  =   ∝Rh 
 
we substitute these values of Kℓ and Kh into the left-hand sides of the above first-order 
conditions: 
 !!ℓ𝓁  !!!!ℓ𝓁    =    1   –    ∝     –    𝜆 ∝       −      𝜃    +        !ℓ𝓁!!ℓ𝓁!!!ℓ𝓁 ∝ 1− 𝜂  
 
and 
 !!!  !!!!!    =    1   –    ∝     –    𝜆 ∝       −      𝜃    +        !!!!!!!!! ∝ 1− 𝜂  
 
{
  
The crucial point is that, typically, these expressions for    !!!!ℓ𝓁  and  !!!!!  cannot both be 
equal to zero, because typically 
	        𝐾ℓ𝓁 −𝑊ℓ𝓁1− 𝐾ℓ𝓁       ≠        𝐾! −𝑊!1− 𝐾! 	  
 
Thus, typically, the laissez-faire equilibrium does not maximise aggregate output subject to 
the wine makers’ credit constraints.  The laissez-faire equilibrium is typically not constrained 
efficient. 
For example, in the special case where 𝑊ℓ𝓁 =𝑊!, since Kℓ  <   Kh, 
 𝜕𝐿𝜕𝐾!     <     0       <        𝜕𝐿𝜕𝐾ℓ𝓁   
	  
	  
– evaluated at the allocation of the laissez-faire equilibrium with credit constraints.  In this 
special case, relative to this laissez-faire allocation, the planner wants to raise Kℓ (raise Pℓ) 
and lower Kh (lower Ph).  With  𝑊ℓ𝓁 =𝑊!, a small increase in the price Pℓ, offset by an equal 
reduction in the price Ph, makes no difference to the wine makers’ (credit-constrained) 
aggregate output, but shifts a little sheep rearing from the less productive boundary on the 
dark side of the valley, productivity F′(1 –  Kℓ), to the more productive boundary on the 
sunny side of the valley, productivity F′(1 –  Kh). 
 The disparity between the planner’s second-best allocation and the laissez-faire 
allocation arises because the planner internalises the effect his choice of KℓSB and KhSB has on 
the prices Pℓ and Ph, whereas the market does not.  Absent the wine makers’ credit constraint, 
and the resultant wedge between their productivity and the marginal productivity of the sheep 
rearers – i.e., in the first-best – this would not matter.  But it does matter in the second-best. 
 
 
  
EXAMPLE 2 
 
The example follows the model in Lorenzoni (2008), but with important differences, 
which will be pointed out. 
There are three dates, t = 0,1,2, and two types of agent, entrepreneurs and consumers.  
There is a consumption good, fruit, that is perishable, and a capital good that perishes at t = 2.  
Unlike in Lorenzoni (2008), there is no uncertainty.  And, critically, there is no financial 
contracting, because there is no collateral available to secure borrowing. 
Start with a representative entrepreneur.  At t = 0, he is endowed with n units of fruit, 
but thereafter he has no endowment.  He can convert fruit into capital, one-for-one:  k0 capital 
held overnight between t = 0 and t = 1 yields him ak0 fruit at t = 2 (not at t = 1 as in 
Lorenzoni (2008)), where a > 1.  Neither capital nor fruit have collateral value, hence no 
borrowing is possible.  The entrepreneur will choose to invest all his endowment in capital:  
k0 = n. 
At t = 1, the capital stock requires maintenance (otherwise it perishes), using up γk0 
fruit, where  γ < 1.  Hence the entrepreneur needs to raise funds, by selling k0 – k1 newly-
maintained capital, at price q (in terms of fruit), where  γ < q < 1.  k1 units of capital held 
overnight between t = 1 and t = 2 yields him again Ak1 fruit at t = 2, where A > 1.  Given that 
there is no borrowing, the maintenance costs have to be wholly met from asset sales: 
	  
γk0   =   q(k0 – k1) 
or   
k1  =  (q – γ)k0/q 
	  
At t = 2, the entrepreneur eats fruit ak0 + Ak1, his utility. 
Now turn to a representative consumer.  She has a large endowment of fruit at each 
date t = 0, 1 and 2.  She eats fruit ct each date:  her utility is c0 + c1 + c2.  She can also 
produce fruit by holding capital overnight between t = 1 and t = 2: in aggregate, k0 – k1 
capital acquired by consumers at t = 1 yields F(k0 – k1) fruit at t = 2.  Specifically, we 
suppose 
    F(k0 – k1)    ≡    2(k0 – k1)½ 
 
The first-order conditions for (non-discounted) profit maximisation: 
 
    F′(k0 – k1)    =    q 
 
imply that at t = 1 the consumers’ demand for capital, k0 – k1, equals  1 𝑞! and that their 
maximised profit (utility), π, from fruit production equals 1 𝑞. 
 
2.1.  Equilibrium 
 
In the market for capital at t = 1: 
 
supply  = γk0 / q 
 
  demand =  1 / q2 
 
Notice that the supply schedule is a downward-sloping function of the price.  However the 
demand schedule is less steeply downward-sloping, which ensures that the equilibrium is 
unique and stable.  See Figure 2. 
The competitive equilibrium price q is  
 
   qCE  = 1 / γk0  
 
which equals 1 / γn given that the entrepreneurs choose k0 = n at t = 0. 
  
 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
The price qCE lies strictly between γ and 1 if we assume:	  
	  
	  
   1 ⁄ γ   <     n <    1 ⁄ γ2   (Assumption 1) 
 
In equilibrium, the consumer profit π is  
 
   πCE = 1 ⁄ q  = γk0, 
 
which equals γn given k0 = n.  And the entrepreneurs’ capital holding k1 between t = 1 and  
t = 2 is  
	  
k1CE  = (q – γ)k0 /q  = (1 – γ2k0)k0, 
k0 – k1  
q 
qCE  
k0 – k1CE  
supply (γk0/q) 
demand (1/q2) 
Figure 2  
 which, given k0  =  n, equals (1 – γ2n)n.     This is positive by Assumption 1. 
We suppose that maintenance costs γk0 are large enough that, in the neighbourhood of 
n, a fall in k0 would lead to a rise in kCE.  Specifically, we assume  
 
γ    >   1 ⁄ √(2n)    or 1 ⁄ 2γ2     <    n  (Assumption 2) 
 
Assumption 2 ensures that 
 
k1CE    =    (1 – γ2k0)k0 
 
would go up if k0 went down.  Note that Assumptions 1 and 2 are compatible.  They can be 
amalgamated: 
 
   max{ 1 / γ,  1 / 2γ2 }    <    n    <    1 / γ2 
 
2.2.  Welfare 
 
Consider the following experiment.  At t = 0, suppose the entrepreneurs are obliged to 
transfer a small amount of fruit, τ0 = ε, to the consumers.   
As a result, the entrepreneurs’ capital investment k0 is reduced by ε – down from n to 
n – ε: 
 
    Δk0  =  – ε  <  0. 
 
This reduction in k0 lowers the entrepreneurs’ maintenance costs γk0 at t = 1, shifts down 
their capital supply schedule in the market, and hence raises the equilibrium price qCE from 
1/γn to 1/γ(n – ε): 
    Δq  ≈  ε/γn2  >  0. 
 
The price rise reduces the consumers’ profit πCE from γn to γ(n – ε): 
 
    Δπ  =  – γε  <  0, 
 
but, since γ < 1, the consumers are more than compensated by the initial payment τ0 = ε.  And 
the entrepreneurs’ capital holding k1CE between t = 1 and t = 2 rises from   (1 – γ2n)n   to    
(1 – γ2n + γ2ε)(n – ε): 
 
    Δk1  ≈  (2γ2n – 1)ε, 
 
which is strictly positive by Assumption 2.  The effect on the entrepreneurs’ consumption 
(utility) at t = 2 is 
 
   aΔk0  +  AΔk1    ≈    – aε  +  A(2γ2n – 1)ε, 
 
which is strictly positive if A is enough larger than a.  Specifically, we assume 
 
   A / a    >    1 / (2γ2n – 1)   (Assumption 3) 
 
Here, the right hand side is strictly greater than 1 given Assumptions 1 and 2.  Hence 
Assumption 3 implies A > a. 
Under Assumptions 1-3, then, the consumers and the entrepreneurs are strictly better 
off as a result of the experiment.  We have a strict Pareto improvement! 
 
2.3.  Intuition for the Pareto improvement 
 
Between t =1 and t = 2, the entrepreneurs’ return on fruit equals   
 
A / q  >  1 
 
whereas consumers’ (marginal) return on fruit only equals 
 
F′(k0 – k1) / q  =  1 
 
This differential in returns reflects the entrepreneurs’ borrowing constraint at t = 1.  Ceteris 
paribus, it would therefore be efficient to inject funds (fruit) into the hands of the 
entrepreneurs at t = 1. 
Unfortunately, consumers cannot commit at t = 0 to pay anything to the entrepreneurs 
at t = 1: in effect the consumers, too, cannot “borrow” at t = 0 because they have no 
collateral.  Also, the entrepreneurs cannot store (perishable) fruit between t = 0 and t = 1. 
However, there is an indirect method of injecting funds.  Namely, raise the price q of 
capital sold by the entrepreneurs at t = 1 – by reducing k0, so as to lower their maintenance 
costs γk0 and thus shift down their capital supply schedule. 
Individually, an entrepreneur cannot raise the price q, and so will not choose to reduce 
his private choice of capital investment at t = 0.  But, collectively, the rise in q helps all 
entrepreneurs. 
The price rise directly hurts the consumers, but the transfer of fruit at t = 0 more than 
compensates. 
Via ak0, the reduction in k0 directly hurts the entrepreneurs’ consumption at t = 2; but 
this is more than made up for via Ak1 and the increase in k1, provided A is enough larger than 
a. 
Everyone is strictly better off.  This strict Pareto improvement is implemented 
through a simple transfer τ0 from the entrepreneurs to the consumers at t = 0.  
 
2.4.  Summary 
  
It may be worthwhile summing up example 2.  Consider the effect on the group of 
entrepreneurs, E, of an upfront transfer from them to the group of consumers, C.  The scale of 
group E’s ex ante investment is reduced, which reduces their maintenance costs, thus 
reducing their need to sell assets at the interim date.  The market-clearing asset price rises, 
which indirectly helps all group E: in effect, funds are injected at the interim date from group 
C to group E.  The gain, to group E, from this injection of funds through the raised asset 
price, can outweigh their direct loss from the transfer.  Meantime, group C indirectly lose 
from the rise in asset price, but this can be more than offset by their direct gain from the 
transfer.  Overall, everyone can be a net gainer: the ex ante transfer can lead to a Pareto 
improvement. 
Notice the somewhat paradoxical nature of the transfer: from the credit-constrained 
group E to the unconstrained group C.  One might have expected the direction to be the other 
way: from the deep pockets (group C) to the shallow pockets (group E).  The reason why the 
upfront transfer from group E to group C works well is that it facilitates an indirect subsidy 
back from group C to group E at the crucial interim date when, at the margin, disinvestment 
by group E is socially inefficient: group E’s return on retaining a marginal unit of asset can 
greatly exceed the return to group C. 
At the heart of this there lies a tension between the individual and the group.  No 
individual entrepreneur would choose to curtail his ex ante investment, because he is too 
small to affect the asset price at the interim date.  As a group, however, the entrepreneurs are 
better off if they reduce their ex ante investment – thereby, at the interim date, reducing their 
maintenance costs and raising the asset price. 
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